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Xueping Wu:How Acquirer Advisors Engage in Loan Financed M&As?
发布时间:2022-12-10 10:03:00 浏览次数:2312

The 267th Wenlan Financial Forum

 

Topic

How Acquirer Advisors Engage in Loan Financed M&As?

Speaker:

Xueping Wu, Associate Professor

Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong

Host

Yongbing Lv, Professor

School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

Deputy Director, Innovation and Talent Base for Digital Technology and Finance

Time:

10:00-11:30, Sunday, December 11, 2022

Location:

VooV Meeting703-515-861

 

Abstract:

Following the Glass-Steagall Act’s 1999 repeal, acquirer advisors have engaged actively in financing the M&A they advise on, producing big-ticket deals. This paper shows that the advisor-led syndicated loans have higher loan spreads than those led by non-advisors. Banks might abet managerial empire-building for rent sharing. But involving the dual role of advisory and financing, the positive information production/certification effect of loan financing is well preserved and post-M&A underperformance is surprisingly absent. As the dual role involvement generates soft information during the complex M&A, we find lower acquirer creditworthiness during the dual-role-involved M&A, supporting the dual role interest rate premium.

 

Speaker Introduction

Dr. Xueping Wu is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and Finance of the City University of Hong Kong. His research interests are both theoretical and empirical. The range of topics of his published work is wide, dealing with stock return momentum under conditional asset pricing, a generalization of the classic Myers-Majluf model, and bank rent extraction in Japan’s main bank system, for example. He and his co-authors also established a so-called Rainbow Asian Option model among exotic option pricing models and a rent-protection-driven rights issue model in corporate finance. Most important, they proposed a theory of growth type compatibility in corporate finance – a fundamental theory that explains why firms grow and persistently seek financing with asymmetric informational imperfections. He recently published a finding that investment banks’ dual role of advisory and loan financing helps bidders to win and complete valuable M&A megadeals. His current work has shown a negative externality of political connections in the context of supply chains. His solo and coauthored work has been published in top finance journals. He has won several best paper awards, including the 1999-WFA Award for the Best Paper in Corporate Finance. He obtained his undergraduate and master’s degrees in management engineering from Tongji University (Shanghai) and his MBA and Ph.D. in Finance from K.U. Leuven (Belgium). He joined the City University of Hong Kong in 1995.

 

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